Maturing short-term debt can impose stronger overhang effect than longterm debt does in distorting the firm's investment and default decisions when the firm refinances its short-term debt in bad times. We derive the optimal maturity structure based on the trade-off between long-term overhang in good times and short-term overhang in bad times. The theory has implications on empirical studies of debt maturity structure, understanding the excessive defaults and underinvestment during recessions, market-based pricing of credit lines, and firm's cash holdings.
Introduction
shows that risky debt that matures in the future leads to underinvestment today.
The insight is that part of the cash flows generated by investment goes to debt holders at maturity; unfortunately the equity holders who make the investment decision will not internalize this benefit. The truncation of cash flows (and implied sharing of them) can distort investment incentives. Myers (1977) therefore suggests the solution of short-term debt to the debt overhang problem, because if all debt matures before the investment opportunity, the firm can make the investment decision as if an all-equity firm. Myers (1977) assumes away costly bankruptcy which essentially makes short-term debt free to use. Once taking into account that bankruptcy is costly, the short-term debt in Myers (1977) is better viewed as debt that has matured (safely) yesterday, rather than the one that is going to mature soon. We stress the importance of timing here; to our knowledge, the empirically relevant situation where the firm has both short-term and long-term debt maturing in the future, while making a series of investment decisions along the way has not been explored. This paper studies the overhang effect on firm's investment decisions caused by short-term debt that is going to mature in the near future.
A general interpretation of "investment" can be spending capital to either establish new projects, or keep old projects alive. For instance, "maintenance" is a form of investment that requires capital expenditure to keep the existing project operating efficiently, and "foregoing maintenance" represents underinvestment. The extreme version of "foregoing maintenance" is just "default," where the firm essentially gives up the old project.
In many financial crises, short-term debt is often implicated as contributing factor to defaults (see Diamond (1991) and Diamond and Rajan (2001) for explanations not explicitly related to debt overhang). By showing that the distortion due to overhang is not a feature of long-term debt exclusively, this paper suggests that the short-term debt overhang can be another important contributing factor to the current crisis. In fact, we show that when the firm's fundamental value is weak, short-term debt imposes stronger overhang effect than long-term debt does, which contributes to a firm's costly early default.
The issue of debt overhang is important to understanding the impact of debt maturity on firm's investment and default decisions. Interestingly, the relative strength of overhang effects caused by the long-term and short-term debt are state-contingent, where the state is the firm's fundamental. In the base model considered in Section 2, the firm determines the maturity structure at date 0, and at date 1 the firm's fundamental value-either good (G) or bad (B) realizes. Negotiation with debt holders is impossible. The firm needs to refinance the short-term debt in both states; and in state G the firm has a positive (new) NPV investment opportunity. At date 2 the old project and the new project (if any) liquidates and the model ends.
At date 1 in state G with strong fundamentals, the firm can refinance the short-term debt easily, and the short-term debt imposes no overhang effect. However, long-term debt holders whose claim mature at tomorrow are standing there to share part of the cash flows generated by the new investment, leading to the standard long-term debt overhang.
The situation is reversed in the bad (B) state. There, the short-term debt matures today, and the firm may have difficulty in refinancing them in raising fresh capital. The new financiers (who can be new equity or junior debt) understand that to prevent the firm from defaulting, the fresh capital that they put in pays the maturing short-term debt first, resulting in a full subsidy to shortterm debt holders. It is true that bailing out the firm also benefits the long-term debt holders who have claim on the firm's future cash flows. However, the subsidy to long-term debt holders will not be as large, because new financiers can still recoup some benefit if the firm recovers tomorrow. Put differently, because there is less uncertainty resolved over the shorter time until the short-term debt matures, in state B injecting fresh capital benefits short-term debt mostly, leading to a greater wealth transfer to short-term debt holders than that to long-term debt holders.
Therefore, once the refinancing constraint is binding in state B, short-term debt imposes a stronger overhang effect than long-term debt.
The base model illustrates the key idea that short-term debt creates an overhang effect on the firm's default decision in state B, while the long-term debt imposes the standard overhang on real investment in state G. Both effects are debt overhang, as the core is that new financiers are unwilling to inject fresh capital to subsidize the existing (either short-term or long-term) debt holders. As a result, ex ante there is a trade-off in determining the optimal debt maturity structure, where the trade-off is between the long-term and short-term debt overhang on different states.
The short-term overhang can also distort real maintenance decisions. Section 3 extends the base model to incorporate a maintenance decision right before the maturity date of short-term debt, and further shows that in state B the short-term debt plays a greater role in distorting the firm's maintenance downward. The intuition is the same: in state B refinancing short-term debt might be problematic, and most of maintenance benefit that the new financiers will not internalize goes to the short-term debt holders rather than long-term debt holders.
The extension with maintenance also clarifies the following theoretical question unanswered in the literature. In our model, maintenance is a long-term investment opportunity, i.e., the incremental cash flows due to maintenance realize at date 2. However, the firm has both the long-term debt with the same maturity (date 2) as that of maintenance, and the short-term debt which is going to mature before date 2. We cannot over-stress the importance of timing, because the effect of most investment decisions is on longer-term cash flows and firms typically have both short-term and long-term debt maturing in the future. From Myers (1977) , we know that debt overhang arises if the debt's maturity coincides with investment/asset maturity. Therefore, a literal interpretation of Myers (1977) 's result would suggest that it is the long-term debt that creates debt overhang on the maintenance decision, not the short-term debt. In contrast, our model shows that the potential default due to short-term debt makes the firm's decision horizon endogenous. Therefore, if early default is along the equilibrium path, then it is short-term debt that imposes a stronger overhang effect on the long-term maintenance.
What drives the state-contingency of the overhang effects of the different maturities of debt?
Fundamentally, short-term debt is a harder claim than long-term debt. Here, "hard" means the nature of non-state-contingency of debt. Because of shorter maturity, short-term debt holders will not share the gain/loss at the interim date with equity holders to the extent that long-term holders do-therefore short-term debt is a harder claim. Interestingly, this maturity-dependent gain/loss sharing rule is a double-edged sword. In our model, in state G when the firm's fundamental value improves, the lack of sharing with short-term debt is beneficial, because the firm can pay the short-term debt off at par and makes the efficient investment decision as if an all-equity firm. In contrast, in state G the long-term debt is hanging there at date 2 with a fixed face value to share the gains with equity holders. This exactly captures the mechanism of short-term debt as a solution to debt overhang proposed in Myers (1977) .
The above reasoning is from the angle of sharing gains at the interim date when good news arrives. The flip side of the above reasoning, which is perhaps more interesting but less emphasized in the literature, is the sharing of "losses." In state B, the firm fundamental drops, and there will be some refinancing losses to be absorbed. Now the lack of sharing of short-term debt is detrimental: Since short-term debt holders demand full payment back, new financiers are reluctant to subsidize them, leading to inefficient maintenance and even default. In contrast, the softer long-term debt, by absorbing certain losses with equity holders, alleviates the debtoverhang problem. Therefore, the angle of loss sharing generates an opposite prediction of Myers (1977) : the short-term debt leads to stronger overhang than long-term debt.
Debt overhang has been an active research topic since Myers (1977) ; 2 this paper links debt overhang to the firm's endogenous default decision, which has been analyzed in Bulow and Shoven (1978) and Leland (1994) . 3 We formalize the analysis of debt overhang effect on the firm's endogenous default decision, and emphasize the role of short-term debt overhang in this paper. The fact that short-term debt is a hard claim suggests that the short-term debt overhang effect is in a zero-one nature. To be precise, when the firm is away from its refinancing constraint, short-term debt barely imposes any overhang effect. However, once the firm has experienced a series of negative shocks and refinancing constraint is looming, short-term debt overhang quickly becomes overwhelming. This in turn leads to sizable underinvestment or even default.
Interestingly, when short-term debt is implicated as contributing factor to defaults in the current crisis, often times it is attributed to "run" caused by short-term debt (Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , Diamond and Rajan (2001) , Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) , and He and Xiong (2009a) ). Meanwhile, researchers acknowledge the debt-overhang effect in bailing out financial firms, but mostly attribute the overhang effect to existing long-term debt. Our paper shows that in fact short-term debt can also be the leading cause of debt-overhang. portion of what was originally long-term debt when it was issued. In this sense, they are 2 To name a few recent studies on debt overhang, see Hennessy (2004) and Philippon and Schnabl (2009) . 3 The interpretation of endogenous default given debt burden as "underinvestment" due to debt-overhang, is mentioned in, for example, Lambrecht and Myers (2008) and He (2009 comparing two otherwise identical firms but with different maturity structure. They find that firms with larger current portion of long-term debt cut back investment more than those with smaller current portion, and attribute this result to the disruption of credit market during the 2007/2008 crisis. However, in our model even though the ability to raise new funds from financial markets is prefect, the larger current portion of long-term creates stronger short-term overhang effect, which can also leads firms to cut back their investment/maintenance. Therefore, their empirical design is not perfect in separating the story of disruption of credit market from that of short-term debt overhang.
5
Our theoretical results have important implications on empirical literature in testing the Myers (1977) debt-overhang theory, especially the prediction that growth firms (presumably with more investment opportunities) should have more short-term debt in their debt maturity structure. The existing empirical evidence on this prediction has been mixed. For instance, Barclay and Smith (1995) and Guedes and Opler (1996) find a negative relation between maturity and growth opportunities, a result consistent with Myers (1977) . However, these studies do not control for firm leverage. Since leverage usually is positively correlated with maturity, their finding could be due to that growth firms tend to have less leverage. In contrast, Johnson (2003) acknowledges that maturity and leverage are jointly endogenously determined in reality.
Using the standard two-stage instrumental variables regression technique, Johnson finds a positive relation between maturity and growth opportunities. 6 In light of our theory, these mixed results are not surprising, because 1) early default for growth firms might be more costly which pushes optimal maturity structure toward long-term, and 2) the presence of short-term and longterm debt has state-contingent overhang effect on investment.
The optimal maturity structure in our paper is based on the trade-off due to long-term and short-term overhang. It is different from existing theories of optimal maturity structure which focus on the disciplinary role to short-term debt in curbing the managers' asset substitution or other misbehavior, e.g., Calomiris and Kahn (1991) , Rajan (2001), Flannery (1994) and Leland (1998) , or private information of borrowers about their future credit ratings, 5 As supporting evidence to the credit supply story, Almeida et al (2009) show that their results do not hold in noncrisis times. But since non-crisis times might coincide with high fundamental episodes, this evidence lacks the power to tell the credit supply channel apart from the short-term overhang channel. 6 In fact, Stohs and Mauer (1996) control the firm leverage directly (i.e., unfitted value) and also find a significantly positive relationship.
e.g., Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991) . 7 Benmelech (2006) argues that entrenchment can lead the self-interested manager to take long-term debt, and provide supporting evidence for this theory. He and Xiong (2009b) study the impact of bond market illiquidity on credit risk.
Although they also point out the overhang effect on the firm's endogenous default is stronger when rolling over short-term debt, the trade-off is different as in their model the benefit of shortterm debt comes from its greater liquidity in the secondary market.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 studies the base model, and Section 3 introduces maintenance into the base model. Section 4 considers extensions. In Section 5 we conclude. All proofs are placed in Appendix.
The Base Model
Consider the following model. At t=0 the firm needs to raise financing in debt for initial investment. To focus on the implication of debt-overhang on the firm's debt maturity choice, we fix in the main analysis. Section 
V
For simplicity the risk-free rate is zero, and agents are all risk neutral. In this model shocks are all independent. All information is public. No cash flows from the asset occur before date 2, and we ignore cash holding. There are other studies on firm's debt maturity structure. Moore (1994, 1998 ) study the optimal debt maturity that persuades the entrepreneur to pay out cash flows; their analysis is based on renegotiation, which is ruled out in this paper for debt overhang to exist in the first place. Brunnermeier and Yogo (2009) stress the option value of using short-term financing so that the firm can readjust the debt maturity before the firm has experienced sufficiently negative shocks. In our model, the short-term debt matures after the sufficiently negative shock arrives. And, Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2009) study the maturity rat race between creditors; there, short-term creditors impose negative externalities on long-term creditors, leading to excessive short-term debt in equilibrium. 8 Positive cash holding, even financed by raising more debt at t=0, can mitigate the debt overhang problem. As we discussed in Section 4.3, this is because cash holding can generate state-contingent debt maturity, which is different from existing theories of liquidity holdings. However, in the presence of physical cash holding cost, e.g., double taxation on cash holding interest, and (may be more importantly) other well-known managerial misbehaviors, e.g., cash diversion or pet projects, positive cash holding cannot resolve the debt-overhang completely. In fact, as we
2.1

Short-term and Long-term Debt Contracts
We only consider standard debt contracts. The short-term debt, with date 0 market value has a face value . In other words, the firm needs to repay/refinance at t=1. The long-term debt, with a date 0 market value , has a face value that the firm needs to repay at t=2. We can summarize the firm's debt policy as (1977) , because with probability
p the investment benefits the long-term debt holders (otherwise they recover zero value from the asset-in-place), the overhang effect due to long-term debt increases with . Therefore we can interpret as a measure of the severity of long-term debtoverhang problem.
p p
Solving the Model
We start analyzing the model at t=1. For ease of discussion we consider the case that any new financing at t=1 is raised through junior debt. In fact, the new financing could equivalently be raised from existing equity holders/managers or outside equity holders. (with probability 1/2), the refinancing capacity is
The refinancing capacity depends on the long-term debt face value, as when 2 2 B V V = it is longterm debt holders that get their payment first (they are senior to any new financings).
Therefore, bailout helps the long-term debt holders with probability 1/2. This reflects the standard debt overhang in Myers (1977) .
2
F
The firm defaults if the maximum refinancing capacity in Eq. (1) is below the short-term debt payment 1 F . Therefore the firm defaults when (focusing on the relevant case where )
Immediately we see that the short-term debt adds more weight in firm's default decision, a point that we will discuss shortly. We have two sub-cases to consider. Case 2. When 1
, the firm defaults. The date-1 value of short-term debt is , and the date-1 value of long-term debt is
For ease of analysis here we assume that in bankruptcy the short-term debt is senior to long-term debt. This assumption is not crucial as we have ruled out renegotiation. In fact, we will let 0 α = in the main analysis, and both debt holders recover nothing in bankruptcy. In this case, the priority rule during bankruptcy plays no role in determining the ex ante debt value.
Good State G
Now consider the state G. We focus on the case where the asset-in-place value 1 1 G V V = is sufficiently high that the refinancing capacity always exceeds the face value of short-term debt.
Formally, we assume that for relevant debt policy choice ( )
, F F , we have (recall the up-side occurs with probability 1-p):
The firm will invest if and only if
Here, the first term is the new financiers' benefit given zero value of asset-in-place at t=2, and the second term is the new financiers' benefit when
so that they obtain all the investment benefit.
10
It is the first term that reflects the long-term debt overhang of Myers (1977) : The higher the promised long-term face value , the less the value that the new financiers can extract from new investment at t=1. Assuming that,
then the firm will invest if and only if 2 b F p < .We have the following two sub-cases in state G. Case 1. When 2 b F p > , the firm does not invest in the investment project. At date 1, the value of short-term debt is , and the value of long-term debt is
Case 2. When 2 b F p ≤ , the firm takes the positive NPV investment project. At date 1 the value of short-term debt is , and the value of long-term debt is .
Discussion of Short-term Debt Overhang
We now pause a bit to discuss the economic mechanism here. In state B the firm inefficiently defaults; it is neither because the firm cannot get fairly priced outside-financing (due to 10 Note that
is enough to cover long-term debt face value under condition (3).
F
11 Given investment at t=1, even when 2 0 V = the firm's date-2 value is sufficient to cover the long-term debt payment . To see this, note that
where the second inequality is due to condition (4).
informational problems or financial market disruption), nor because the firm has some nonpleadgeble part of future cash flows (a la Diamond (1991) ) that new financiers cannot internalize. Rather, it is because in order to bail out the firm, the firm/new financiers need to repay its short-term debt fully. In this sense, this mechanism is in a similar spirit with debt overhang in Myers (1977) (and the underinvestment in state G in this model), because the fundamental problem is rooted in the fact there cannot be renegotiations between existing debt holders who demand payment (either immediate as short-term debt, or future as long-term debt), and the firm who makes the investment/default decision.
Therefore, we can generalize the debt-overhang based on the insight from Myers (1977):
Firm's investment decisions (including real investment and default) get distorted because new financiers are not willing to subsidize the existing debt holders. When the overhang effect is about failing to attract new financings to avoid firm's early default, it is the maturing short-term debt which demands immediate repayment that plays a more significant role. This point is clearly reflected in the bankruptcy threshold 2 1 2 F F + , which puts a greater weight on short-term debt. Intuitively, in bailing out the firm from default, new financiers subsidize the maturing short-term debt holders one-to-one. However, by keeping the firm alive the wealth transfer from new financiers to the long-term debt holders is typically less than one-to-one (in this model it is ½ which is probability of positive realizations at t=2). Therefore, the burden on the maturing short-term debt will distort the default decision more than long-term debt.
More broadly, this different weighting also reflects the idea that the short-term debt is a "hard" claim, i.e., short-term debt features less state-contingency than long-term debt. In other words, when news arrives at t=1 in our model, short-term debt holders do not share gain/loss with equity holders to the same extent as long-term debt holders do. Though this lack of sharing is ideal for state G where the short-term debt holders will leave the firm with par and do not impose overhang on the new investment, in state B they demand the full par value back and impose stronger overhang on the firm's default decision. Specifically, when the bad news hits at t=1, given survival the "softer" long-term debt holders take losses with a lower value 2 2 F , while the short-term debt holders' value is still the full face value . As a result, the short-term debt 1 F plays a more significant role in discouraging equity holders (or new financiers) to absorb the economic loss and continue the firm's operation.
This mechanism regarding default can be generalized to firm's real investment decisions during financial distress. In reality, real investment can be either "generating new ideas" as the investment opportunity modeled in state G, or "keeping old ideas alive" which resembles maintenance. Section 3 considers the extension where in state B the firm needs to maintain right before the short-term debt matures. As default can be viewed as the extreme version of foregoing maintenance, we will show that short-term debt imposes stronger overhang effect than long-term debt in cutting back efficient maintenance.
Model Solution
Regions with Investment Polices and Debt Valuations
We illustrate the firm's decisions on the space of debt structure ( ) Figure 2 . As the firm tries to meet the date-0 total debt value , we also calculate the total date-0 debt value for various regions. There are three noteworthy points.
In Figure 2 , only region R1 achieves the first best, which features no default in state B and investment in state G. To calculate the total date-0 debt value, note that state B occurs with probability ½, and without default (which is case 1 in state B) the total debt value is 2 1 2 F F + . On the other hand, the state G occurs with probability ½, and with investment (which is case 2 in state G) the total debt value is 1 2 F F + . Therefore the total date-0 debt value is ( )
In region R1, the above value is maximized at 1 1
2. We assume that 1 2 B b V p > so that region R2 exists. Region R2 represents the case where the firm adopts a long-maturity debt structure, so that the firm will not go bankrupt in bad times (because of small amount of short-term debt) but at the expense of foregoing investment opportunity in good times.
3.
As mentioned in state B case 2, we assume that 0 α = so in bankruptcy debt holders recover nothing. This gives the simple expression for date-0 debt value in region R3 and R4.
More importantly, it is clear that if bankruptcy were to occur in t=1 then the optimal debt structure will have * 2 0 F = which relaxes the long-term debt overhang at no additional cost. This immediately implies that region R3 with investment dominates region R4 without investment.
Debt Capacity and Optimal Maturity Structure
Now we are ready to characterize the optimal maturity structure. Based on Figure 2 , the following lemma gives the debt capacity , which is the maximum value of date-0 debt that the firm can raise in region "i". We want to focus on the case where and ; otherwise, R2 or R3 will be strictly dominated by the first best region. Essentially, we would like to discuss the situation where the firm, given that it cannot meet the target debt level without triggering any debt overhang problem, can indeed raise more debt at the expense of some overhang cost. For instance, R3 is the region where the firm takes excessive short-term debt (so reducing long-term debt) to ensure the efficient investment in state G; and R2 represents the strategy of "playing it safe" by prolonging the debt maturity to avoid costly bankruptcy in state B. Only when both R2
and R3 are along the equilibrium path the firm will balance the trade-off between long-term and short-term overhang. To this end, we impose the following parameterization assumption.
. And, we assume that .
For ease of discussion we further assume that
is the greatest number among these three debt capacities. Therefore we have the ranking of . And, given that the firm is able to raise the target debt , the trade-off between region R2 and R3 depends on the relative magnitude of investment benefit b versus bankruptcy cost (
We have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The optimal maturity structure is characterized as follows. 
, then the optimal maturity structure satisfies
≥ ; otherwise without loss of generality ) where (
, without loss of generality ( )
Comparative Statics
We provide some comparative statics in the next proposition. As explained before, we use p to proxy for the long-term debt overhang. Since short-term debt overhang is negatively related to the firm's refinancing capacity, we use 1B V to (negatively) proxy for the magnitude of shortterm overhang. Because the optimal debt structure is a set (more precisely, an interval of a line as shown in Figure 2 with 0
), the comparative statics describe the extreme points of this set.
F F be the highest short-term debt face value in the optimal solution, and similarly we define ( ) ( ) 
The results in Proposition 2 confirm our intuition that when long-term (short-term) debt overhang is stronger, the firm will use less long-term (short-term) debt.
Proposition 2. For the optimal debt structure ( ) 
The Model with Maintenance
The Model
We have shown that short-term debt overhang distorts the firm's default decision in Section 2. To further illustrate that the short-term debt can impose stronger overhang effects (than longterm debt) that distort the firm's (real) investment policy in bad states, we consider the following extension of the base model. The state of G or B realizes at t=0.5, and at this time the firm needs to carry out maintenance for existing assets before the short-term debt is maturing at t=1. At t=1 the firm refinances its maturing short-term debt payment , and a premature default yields a scrap value of
12 Again, for simplicity we assume that 0 α = . See Figure 2 for the timeline of the model with maintenance.
Bad State
12 Besides the (either direct or indirect) cost of bankruptcy, here 1 α < also captures the idea that the debt holders who get the control rent at t=1 have missed the best-timing for maintenance (i.e., t=0.5).
Again we start with the bad state. With probability 1/2 the bad state (B) occurs, in which case the firm's asset-in-place has a value of ( • Without maintenance, the firm asset-in-place depreciates, and as a result the asset-inplace 1 V is 1B V or 0 with equal probabilities at t=1.
We will refer to the shocks at t=1 with maintenance as negative or positive shocks, in contrast to the good or bad state realized at t=0.5. It is easy to calculate the total net gain of maintenance to be
, therefore it has a positive NPV. At t=2 the asset-in-place has a value of V or 0 with equal probabilities, where V depends on the firm's maintenance decision.
Remark 1. Here we impose major part of efficiency loss due to "no maintenance" on the downside, i.e., with probability one half the asset becomes worthless without maintenance. In this sense, defaulting is similar to forgoing maintenance-the firm refuses to inject fresh capital to prevent immediate losses from occurring. More generally, we may interpret "no maintenance" as partial liquidation with a fire-sale price, and choosing to default (discontinue) becomes an extreme version of no maintenance.
Remark 2. The reader might think that as the firm makes maintenance decision (at t=0.5) before the short-term debt matures (at t=1), the Myers (1977) framework readily applies. It is not that simple. We stress that in our model the maintenance generates cash flows at t=2 (as the new investment opportunity at state G does), which coincides with the long-term debt maturity date.
In other words, the maintenance has the same cash flow timing as that of long-term debt, so a literal interpretation of Myers (1977) intuition would suggest that long-term debt imposes stronger overhang. We will come back to this issue in Section 3.5.
Good State.
The state G is the same as in the base model. It is immaterial to have maintenance decision at t=0.5 or not, as we mainly focus on the case where the value of asset-in-place in state G is sufficiently high to ensure financing for maintenance. Clearly the investment policy in state G is the same as in the base model. Therefore we will focus on the maintenance decision in state B.
Maintenance Decision in State B
Maintenance Financing
When the state B realizes at t=0.5, the firm decides whether to raise new financing to fund maintenance. Both the maturity and seniority of the new maintenance financing play some role in determining whether the firm can finance the maintenance and potentially avoid bankruptcy.
Obviously, to analyze the overhang effect of existing debt, Assumption 1 stipulates the new financing to be junior to existing long-term and short-term debt. But there is a third kind of debt in the model, which is the new debt that the firm needs to issue at t=1 to repay the maturing short-term debt 1 F . It turns out that the relative seniority between the maintenance financing raised at t=0.5 and the new debt issued at t=1 to repay the existing short-term debt 1 F matters for the firm's optimal policy, and in turn the debt overhang effects.
Our focus is to study the overhang effect due to existing debt. For this reason, we try to minimize the overhang effect due to the new financing, either for maintenance or repaying the short-term debt 1 F . In the following lemma, we formally characterize the optimal security that the firm will adopt in funding maintenance.
Lemma 2. It is optimal for the firm to set the maintenance financing at t=0.5 to mature at t=2, and to be junior to the new financing at t=1 for repaying short-term debt face value 1 F .
Intuitively, one powerful but unavailable solution to debt overhang is to make new debt senior to existing debt. The flip side of this solution, which is the backbone of Lemma 2, is that when the firm needs to issue some new debt while preserving maximal future investment incentives, it is optimal to keep the current new debt as junior as possible. As a result, the firm should set the new debt issued at t=0.5 to be the most junior claim, so that the t=1 new financiers have the right incentives in refinancing the maturing short-term debt 1 F . Therefore, our analysis
gives the lower-bound of overhang effect due to existing debt, because in reality there might be other reasons why the new financing for maintenance would be short-term and senior and consequently impose a stronger overhang effect.
Maintenance and Bankruptcy
There are three cases to consider depending on the value of asset-in-place 1B V .
Case 1: Maintenance, no bankruptcy at t=1
Suppose that there is maintenance at t=0.5 and no bankruptcy at t=1. This implies that at t=1 even when the firm is able to refinance the short-term debt repayment
Therefore we need that
) 1 , where we invoke the result in Lemma 2, i.e., the maintenance financing at t=0.5 does not affect the maximum amount that the firm can promise to new financiers at t=1. This condition is equivalent to
As we are analyzing debt overhang, we need to check whether the firm is indeed willing to take maintenance at t=0.5. At t=2, the maintenance financiers' payoff is capped by (note that at t=1 the newly promised face value for refinancing short-term debt is ). Given that 
For instance, the second term captures the incremental maintenance benefit at the node , as without maintenance Figure 3) . The firm will maintain if the benefit exceeds maintenance cost 1B mV , i.e., ( )
Due to the overhang effect, the threshold in (6) is strictly higher than ( ) 
Case 2: No maintenance, bankrupt at t=1 if negative shock hits
From the analysis in Case 1, the firm will not maintain if
given no maintenance at t=0.5 the firm must default when the asset-in-place 1 0 V = with probability ½. When the firm's asset-in-place has a value of , the firm is able to refinance the 1B V 13 As shown in Case 1, a successful refinancing of short-term debt when
is not enough to guarantee maintenance, because the existing debt overhang truncates the maintenance benefit, leading to a higher maintenance threshold than the threshold with "just successfully refinancing given negative shocks at t=1." We will consider an interesting extension in Section 4.1 where under market-based-pricing for their credit lines (revolvers), firms have greater maintenance incentives as maintenance at t=0.5 can affect their refinancing cost at t=1. 
Case 3: No maintenance, bankrupt at t=1 always
Finally, when the asset-in-place value drops further below, i.e.,
the firm defaults at t=1 for sure. At t=0.5 both the short-term and long-term debt values are zero.
Investment/Maintenance Polices and Debt Valuations
As in Figure 2 in Section 2.3.3, in Figure 4 we give various policies (including investment, maintenance, or default) depending on the debt structure ( ) Figure 4 decomposes the no bankruptcy region into two regions: one is with maintenance, and the other is without maintenance. We use abbreviations here. For instance, "M, NB; I" in Region R1 stands for "in state B the firm maintains, no bankruptcy at t=1; and in state G the firm invests." And, "NM, B; I" in Region 2 stands for "in state B the firm does not maintain and bankrupts at t=1 when negative shock hits, and in state G the firm invests." In region R3 "BB" means that the firm bankrupts at t=1 (for both positive and negative shocks). We also calculate the date-0 expected total debt value across regions in Figure 4 . There are three noteworthy points.
1. Only region R1 achieves the first best, where the firm invests in state G and maintains in state B. Being constrained in R1, the date-0 debt value is maximized at ( ) (and defaults with probability 1/2) in state B, while R4 gives the exactly opposite policy. The choice between R2 and R4 reflects the trade-off between long-term and short-term overhang stressed in this paper.
3. As we have argued before, if bankruptcy were sure to occur in state B in t=1 (regions R3 and R6), then the optimal debt structure will have * 2 0 F = which relaxes the long-term debt overhang at no additional cost. This immediately implies that R3 dominates R6.
Optimal Solution
Debt Capacities
Recall debt capacity is the maximum date-0 debt value that can be supported in region 
Optimal Maturity Structure
As just mentioned, we restrict attention to the following three regions. The region R1 is the first-best case; if then choosing R1 is optimal. When the firm has a tradeoff. The region R2 features a greater short-term overhang (a greater ) so that the firm foregoes maintenance in state B but invests in state G. In contrast, in region R2 the opposite holds: there, long-term debt overhang is stronger (a greater ), so that the firm passes the investment in state G but maintains in state B. To avoid the uninteresting case where either R2 or R4 is dominated, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Under certain parameter restrictions imposed in the Appendix, and
, so neither region R2 nor region R4 is dominated by the first-best region R1.
By comparing investment and maintenance, the firm prefers region R2 if
where the LHS (RHS) is the NPV of investment (maintenance). But the ultimate choice of optimal region depends on the target date-0 debt value, and the debt capacities in both regions.
For instance, suppose that . Then for the firm will choose R2 against R4. However, if , then the firm has no choice but R4. ( )
2.
Suppose that
If condition (7) 
Debt-Overhang with Long-Term Investment
Short-term debt, which is about to mature, imposes a stronger overhang effect in distorting the maintenance decision when the firm is in financial distress. It might seem like this is exactly the Myers (1977) result: Because in the model maintenance is taken place at t=0.5 before the short-term debt matures at t=1, maintenance will be distorted downward. Though this indeed captures part of the mechanism, our result goes deeper. The Myers (1977) result readily applies if we assume that maintenance generates cash flows at t=1 which coincides with the timing of short-term debt maturity. However, in our model the t=0.5 maintenance still produces incremental cash flows at t=2. A literal interpretation of Myers (1977) will suggest that it is the long-term debt maturing at t=2 that imposes the overhang effect. Therefore, relative to Myers (1977) , the new ingredient in our model is the short-term debt that needs to be refinanced at t=1 before the realization of final cash flows.
We cannot over-stress the importance of timing, because the effect of most investment decisions is on longer-term cash flows and firms typically have both short-term and long-term debt maturing in the future. Therefore, we are taking one step beyond Myers (1977) , and asking the following question: Given that both short-term and long-term debt can be risky, which one
imposes stronger debt-overhang in distorting firm's (long-term) investment decision?
Our results show that once the short-term debt becomes risky (i.e., early default is possible along the equilibrium path), short-term debt imposes a stronger overhang effect than long-term debt does. Essentially, when the firm is considering maintenance to improve the firm value, both debt obligations overhang the payoffs from the maintenance. Because short-term debt is going to mature soon, short-term debt holders obtain more benefit than long-term debt holders. This point is evident when the firm lies in the region s part of Case 2 discussed in Section which i 3.2.2. There, the firm could refinance the short-term debt always at t=1 if it were to maintain at t=0.5; but in equilibrium the firm does not. It is because most of maintenance benefit goes to both debt holders if the negative shock hits at t=1. More importantly, the weight is different: Relative to no maintenance, maintenance improves the shortterm debt value from 0 to , while it only improves the long-term debt value from 0 to 1 F 2 2 F . The different weighting exactly mirrors the weight of wealth transfer when date 1 new financiers consider injecting fresh capital to bail out the firm (see related discussion in Section 2.3.1).
One can also understand this result by recognizing that the endogenous default due to shortterm debt shortens the cash flows timing for the otherwise long-term maintenance. As a result, the risky short-term debt imposes stronger overhang than the long-term debt does. This angle also implies that for short-term debt to overhang the firm's maintenance decision, it does not require the early default at t=1 to be costly. As long as t=0.5 is the only time to make efficient maintenance, the endogenous termination at t=1 truncates the firm's decision horizon and the cash flows distribution, and as a result the firm cuts back maintenance at t=0.5.
In general, short-term debt with the possibility of default can impose even greater overhang, simply because there is less uncertainty resolved over the shorter time until it matures and as a result most of the initial benefit in value due to long-term investment (here maintenance) will not result in any payoff to equity. Short-term debt then imposes either no overhang (if riskless) or large overhang (if likely to default), as opposed to the prediction of Myers (1977) . Existing theory about credit lines emphasizes on helping firms overcome liquidity shocks or alleviate risk shifting incentives (e.g., Boot and Thakor (1994) ). Our model suggests that credit lines also alleviate short-term overhang by fixing the refinancing cost in bad times. In other words, part of new financiers (here the bank who issued credit line to the firm at t=0) contractually committed to subsidize the maturing short-term debt holders, making the firm less likely to default in state B.
Extensions and Discussion
To illustrate this point, consider the following modification. Suppose that the firm has an exogenously given undrawn credit line 1 X F < , against which the firm can draw to repay the maturing short-term debt at t=1. Here, for the sake of argument we simply assume that the existing line is for repaying short-term debt only.
14 Denote by the gross (promised) interest rate for drawdown, which we simply assume to be 1.5. This captures two ideas. First, suppose that in state G the new investment project is R 14 The firm may draw down its credit line directly for maintenance at t=0.5. Here, we focus on the decision of raising external maintenance financing given some optimal drawdown policy at t=0.5 (which balances off the maintenance financing at t=0.5 and refinancing at t=1). There are two reasons why this treatment is reasonable. First, given debt-overhang, firms may not have incentives to maintain at t=0.5 even with subsidized rate, and in general the firms' optimal policy is to hold some buffer for t=1 bad shocks. Second, our analysis will be focusing on the impact of future refinancing pricing (i.e., market-based pricing) on today's maintenance decision.
sufficiently profitable that the market price for new financing is the risk free price 1. Therefore, the firm will not draw the line in state G. 15 Second, in state B the market price for new financing is 2, because the firm will default at t=2 with probability half. As a result, to refinance the maturing short-term debt 1 F at state B, the firm will draw down the line completely at the committed price of R=1.5 before it seeks new financing from the market. Specifically, to repay , the firm needs to promise
where the first (second) term is the promise to the bank (new financiers from the market).
16 Therefore, to avoid default the total promised debt payment at t=2 (including the existing long-
Clearly, it is because at state B the bank is subsidizing the firm's refinancing cost (as 2 R < ) through the pre-arranged credit line. This leads to a weaker short-term overhang on default decision, as when V the firm survives if
importantly, a weaker short-term overhang in turn boosts the firm's incentives to maintain at t=0.5. As the analysis in case 1of Section 3.2.2, the firm will maintain if
When , this criterion is
Hence, the maintenance region expands relative to the case of no credit line ( ). 0 X =
Market based pricing
A recent innovation to the contract of credit-lines/revolvers is market-based pricing; that is, the interest rate of new-drawdowns is partially tied to the firm's current strength. This is a form of performance-based pricing which is common in the bank debt (e.g., Asquith, Beatty, and Weber (2005) ). More specifically, when the firm draws on the remaining line, the drawn spread Conversely, if the CDS spread at the time of the draw is higher than the cap, the cap is applied.
Finally, if the CDS spread at the time of the draw falls in between the floor and cap, certain formula will apply.
17
The repricing of the cost of borrowing against the line leaves the firm's cost of borrowing higher when fundamentals are bad, much like short-term debt. To the extreme case where the drawdown rate is fully market based, then this essentially takes away the insurance that the bank offered to the firm. As a result, there is no difference between new financiers and the bank, and we are back to the model we have analyzed in Section 2 and 3.
However, in our model, debt overhang is not all about insurance. In our model, even though both default and maintenance decisions suffer from debt overhang, there exists subtle but important difference. Insurance, by forcing a subsidy from bank to maturing debt holders, always alleviates the distortion of default decision. However, for maintenance, the heart of overhang lies in the firm's maintenance "incentives," which can be positively related to market-based pricing.
This insight motivates us to show that a properly designed market-based pricing on credit lines is better than credit lines without market-based-pricing. Essentially, when the firm needs refinancing down the road, market-based-pricing, through reducing future refinancing cost, which is amount of date-2 cash flows to debt holders. This is higher than without market-based-pricing. Even though it seems to hurt the firm's maintenance incentives, we now show that in fact the opposite holds.
The firm is more likely to maintain, because in addition to standard maintenance benefit analyzed in Section 3.2, maintenance at t=0.5 can save its refinancing cost by ( 
or equivalently, So what do we learn from this exercise? Essentially, this properly designed market-basedpricing combines two components embedded in short-term debt overhang and its related maintenance decisions. The first is the insurance that protects the firm from those states with deteriorating asset-in-place, which alleviates short-term overhang on the firm's default decision.
The second is the performance-based sensitivity that entices the firm's maintenance; notice that in Figure 5 , by design the market-based performance is solely driven by maintenance action.
Therefore, the core idea here is similar to optimal contracting with moral hazard, which is to reward/punish the firm for its actions (here, maintenance) but not for fundamental states beyond its actions. Interestingly, this angle further suggests that although long-term debt CDS has its own advantages (e.g., more liquid and accurate pricing) over short-term debt CDS to be the market-base in designing the market-based-pricing scheme, the ideal market-base-measure would be state-dependent. In bad times, stronger short-term overhang implies that short-term debt CDS might contain more action-based information than long-term debt CDS does, simply because the wealth transfer due to investment is greater for short-term debt when the firm is close to default.
Endogenizing Leverage 0
D
Now we endogenize the target date-0 debt value . A tradeoff between saving taxes versus increasing bankruptcy costs will yield a positive value of , for standard reasons. There is not much special about this approach in our framework. An alternative is to account for the control role of debt, and of short-term debt in particular. This section describes such an approach. This added structure will prove to be useful in extending our results below. We assume that equity holders are soft claims that are subject to renegotiation.
maintenance incentive in the up state with slack refinancing constraint. With a more general structure, we can have market-based-pricing to alleviate overhang effect on default decision directly, and then feeds back to the firm's maintenance incentives. Suppose that we have a medium state at t=1 state B. Then we can easily construct an example where maintenance, through affecting the refinancing cost at the medium state, helps the firm stay above the overhang/default region, which further raises the maintenance incentives.
We will use a very simple model motivated by Jensen (1986) , Hart and Moore (1994) , Diamond and Rajan (1999 ), and Diamond (2004 , 2006 . It introduces managerial "equity overhang," where managers take a fraction λ of all free cash flow in excess of debt payments.
We follow Diamond (2004 Diamond ( , 2006 and assume that default on debt allows the legal system to prevent the manager from consuming any cash they divert instead of paying out or investing (giving the manager nothing if the legal sanction is imposed). 20 Legal sanctions remove any of the benefit of diversion which occurs that period, but not the benefit of diversion in previous periods. Contracts are written such that this legal sanction is imposed if a debt contract is not paid on its due date. The threat of this legal sanction ensures that debt is paid when cash is available, and because debt cannot be renegotiated, the default automatically imposes the sanction. However equity contracts (which are soft) do not have automatic sanctions so that equity holders have no right to impose the legal sanction for default. We simply assume that the manager can take a fraction λ of remaining cash flows, which can be motivated by λ being the relative bargaining power of the manager in dealing with equity holders. Equivalently, we can assume that the manager is able to directly divert all free cash and retain a fraction λ of it (while destroying a fraction 1-λ ) in a way that cannot be verified or recovered without legal sanctions.
As a result, owners of outside equity allow the manager to take a fraction λ of current free cash flow each period, if the manager so desires, given its effect on his current or future payoffs.
To recap, at t=0 the firm raises equity and debt to carry out the investment. 21 At t=1 the refinancing decision is controlled by the existing shareholders. Because issuing any new equity only benefits the entrepreneur and dilutes their own value, the new financing is in the form of (junior) debt. And t=2 the manager can get (at least) λ fraction of free cash flows after the debt payment.
Denote by the value of entrepreneur/manager, the value of (outside) equity, and the value of long-term and short-term debt. The agency problem at t=2 implies that 0
i.e., the manager has to have sufficient inside stake for him to behave. The initial investment requires that ; if this inequality holds strictly then the entrepreneur/manager can consume the difference at date-0. Therefore the entrepreneur's date-0 value is
Finally, denote by the date-0 firm value as a function of date-0 debt value, where the firm value is determined by the optimal maturity structure derived in Proposition 1. Because the only agency issue that hurts the firm value is debt overhang, it is easy to see that is decreasing in . Finally, the accounting identity implies that
Therefore the manager who chooses the date-0 financial structure solves the following problem: 
The first restriction ( ) implies that using outside equity only cannot raise enough capital to cover initial investment; and the second condition 
Cash Reserve?
One potential solution to the debt overhang is that the firm maintains cash reserves. We will first investigate the role of cash reserve by ignoring the agency issue of managerial diverting that we introduced in Section 4.2, then discuss the interesting interaction between the managerial diverting and debt overhang.
State-contingent maturity
It is clear that raising cash reserves that are not subject to agency problems (diverting, dividend payout, etc.), while holding total debt issuance fixed, could alleviate debt-overhangsimply because we can interpreted cash as negative debt. The more interesting question is, can the firm reduce overhang by issuing more debt at t=0, say 0 D C + where , and keeping C inside the firm as cash reserve? The answer is yes.
C >
In our model, if the firm can issue debt with state-contingent maturity, then the optimal contract will be short-term debt in state G (so there is no long-term overhang on new investment) and long-term debt in state B (so there is no short-term overhang in triggering early default).
Interestingly, a cash reserve, by allowing the firm to have a state-contingent repayment policy, precisely generates this state-dependent maturity structure. To be specific, in state B, the firm can use the cash to pay part of short-term debt at t=1, while in state G the firm will use cash to pay part of long-term debt at t=2. Because cash is raised by a mixture of short-term and longterm debt at t=0, this state-contingent repayment policy help the firm transform some long-term (short-term) debt to short-term (long-term) debt in state G (B), which is value improving in this model.
Debt overhang on manager's diverting decision
Of course, the very reason to have debt in the first place, as discussed in Section 4.2, is because the manager can divert some of the firm's free cash flows. This militates against having the firm pile up extra cash, because for any dollar that sitting in the firm at t=1 in excess of shortterm debt payment, the manager can divert it to obtain λ at t=1 (and the date 2 default is too late to recover it). Interestingly, different from the standard argument (e.g., DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) ) that the manager's inside equity stake will prevent him from diverting the cash at the interim date t=1 (because he can get λ fraction of free cash flows at t=2), in our setting the manager will strictly prefer to divert at t=1, if the outside equity holders cannot promise to the manager more than λ fraction of t=2 free cash flows. The reason is just debt overhang: the manager understands that the cash left in the firm goes to the debt holders first at t=2, and therefore he has a strict incentive to divert at today rather than wait to share the cash tomorrow.
For illustration, suppose that there is one dollar of free cash flow in the firm at t=1, and in our model at t=2 the firm is solvent with probability ½. Then diverting today gives the manager a λ utility of λ , while the expected value by waiting to share the free cash flows with outside equity holders at t =2 is only 2 λ . Here, the manager will divert earlier along the equilibrium path because the debt coming due tomorrow hangs over his own "inside-equity." As a result, holding extra cash does not overcome the short-term debt overhang of injecting new cash because the manager's payoff is very much like that of newly-injected equity.
Conclusion
Debt overhang influences the investment and default decisions of those whose claims are like equity. Long term debt causes overhang because it prevents equity from receiving any payoff from investment when the ex-post payoff is low enough that there is default. Short-term debt with the possibility of default can impose even greater overhang, simply because there is less uncertainty resolved over the shorter time until it matures and as a result most of the first part of any initial increase in value (due to investment or bailout) will not result in any payoff to equity.
Short-term debt then imposes either no overhang (if riskless) or large overhang (if likely to default). The timing of debt maturity can have a major impact on investments, especially on investments that can help avoid default.
The problems caused by large impending debt maturity go beyond the risk of runs and limited access to liquidity. The timing of repayments, access to lines of credit, and the pricing of credit lines all combine to either amplify or reduce the risks of potential default.
Appendix Proof of Lemma 1
For claim 1, we need to show that 
Proof of Proposition 1
The second part follows from the argument in proving claim 3 in Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
The results are obvious from Figure 2 .
Proof of Lemma 2
First note that if there is no maintenance in equilibrium, then the seniority of maintenance does not matter. So we focus on the case where maintenance is along the equilibrium. But in our model this implies that we have to make sure that the firm does not default (successfully refinance short-term debt) in state B. It is because if the firm defaults at t=1 given negative shocks, then the expected maintenance benefit at t=0.5 is only 1 2 B m V which is less than the maintenance cost 1B mV . As a result, maintenance is off equilibrium.
This finding implies that the problem boils down to maximize the refinancing capacity for repaying short-term debt at t=1 given negative shocks. This is achieved by letting maintenance financing be junior to the new financing at t=1 repaying short-term debt. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 3
The calculation follows exactly as proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 4
We require the following restriction in 
Proof of Proposition 3
In the main text we have given two cases; now we give the rest of three cases. 
